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RELIGION: INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION OR 
INTERTWINED WITH CULTURE? 
FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
AND GREAT BRITAIN 
BY JOHANNA R. COLLINS-WOOD* 
In contemporary Western society, an individual’s freedom to believe 
or not believe in any particular religion is considered a fundamental human 
right.1 Part of an individual’s religious belief includes the ability to express 
that belief through the individual’s interactions with the greater society.2 
However, it is also accepted that states reserve the right to restrict an 
individual’s expression of his or her belief in order to facilitate societal 
benefits, such as “public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.”3 The tension between these two 
fundamental beliefs is articulated through the different ways national 
judiciaries work out systems of discerning the pivotal moment when a 
government’s interest in its citizens’ benefits as a whole allows the 
government to intervene and restrict an individual’s expression of his or her 
religious beliefs.4 Moreover, the way in which a country’s judiciary 
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 1.  E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 18, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].  
 2.  Freedom of Religion or Belief Toolkit, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 4  (2011), 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/global-issues/human-rights/freedom-toolkit.  
 3.  ICCPR, supra note 1. 
 4.  Compare Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (holding that “if 
prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object...but merely the incidental effect of a generally 
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”), with R (on the 
Application of Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15, 
[2007] 1 A.C. 100 (H.L.) [114] (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding that “a limitation [on religion] . . . 
must be . . . necessary . . . for a permissible purpose...and must be proportionate in scope and effect).  
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chooses to draw the line between an individual’s free expression and the 
government’s right to intervene provides an illustration of how that nation 
characterizes the fundamental nature of religious beliefs. 
The United Kingdom and the United States share a common legal 
system and a common heritage, as Great Britain served as the “parent” 
from which the United States was born. The two countries’ background of 
protection for free expression of religion and the judicial structures for 
preserving that freedom are, however, very different.  The United States 
has a long history of seeking to protect both religious belief and expression 
from state control. These freedoms were inscribed into the U.S. 
Constitution,5 commented on in writings by the Founding Fathers,6 and 
supported by the U.S. Congress.7 The United States’ dual court system 
containing both federal and state courts, as well as the evolution of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence as a result of various compositions of the 
Court’s bench, have produced a complex system for protecting free 
expression. Most importantly, the American system has evolved to focus 
on an individual’s self-expression of religion. American courts have 
specifically chosen not to attempt to determine what constitutes a religious 
belief or practice.8 A religious belief may not be “acceptable, logical, 
consistent, or comprehensible,”9 and it may not be held by other adherents 
to that religion.10 The courts, however, have considered any inquiry into the 
legitimacy of the belief as being “not within the judicial function and 
judicial competence.”11 Once a petitioner has claimed a violation of the 
First Amendment’s freedom of expression clause, the court may only 
determine whether the individual’s action is one which has crossed the line 
into an area governed by a “compelling state interest.”12 
In contrast, the United Kingdom views religion and religious beliefs as 
intimately tied to culture, ethnicity, and a larger religious community of 
 
 5.  U.S. CONST. amend. I  (stating “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”).  
 6.  See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802) 
(on file at the Library of Congress), available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html.  
 7.  See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006) 
[hereinafter O Centro Espirita] (explaining Congress’ decision to pass RFRA: “Congress recognized 
that "laws 'neutral' toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere 
with religious exercise," and legislated "the compelling interest test" as the means for the courts to 
"strike sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”).  
 8.  See Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 714 
(1981).  
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. at 715-16.  
 11.  Id. at 716.  
 12.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). 
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believers.13 The United Kingdom does not possess a written constitution 
guaranteeing any form of human rights or freedoms.14 Issues of freedom of 
belief, religious expression, or any other human right must be resolved by 
reference to U.K. legislation, general common law, European Union law, or 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).15 Prior to the 
establishment of the European Union, and the adoption of the ECHR, 
freedom of expression claims could only come before British courts if they 
were based on some form of statutory authority, generally the Race 
Relations Act of 1976.16 The use of the Race Relations Act to resolve free 
expression cases resulted in the British court making determinations about 
the authenticity and validity of the plaintiff’s claim religious expression.17 
The court adopted this form of judicial inquiry to determine whether the 
disputed religious expression could be protected as an aspect of a particular 
ethnic or racial group.18 The British statutory system offers a different view 
of the nature and function of religion, seeing it as an element that binds a 
particular community together and thereby is protectable under the same 
statutory regime that protects communities bound by other elements such 
as language, race or ethnicity. 
The adoption of the ECHR through the United Kingdom’s Human 
Rights Act of 199819 offers a second type of protection regime for 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs now have the ability to request relief under ECHR 
Article 9, a more general protection provision similar to Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution.20 When British courts apply the ECHR, however, they 
rely upon precedent from the European Court of Human Rights.21 In 
contrast to both the British system’s focus on religion as part of a 
community culture, and the American focus on religion as a method of self-
expression, the European Court of Human Rights has chosen not to 
characterize the nature of claims for free expression of religion. Instead, it 
has simply deferred to the national laws under which these suits arise. As a 
 
 13.  See generally R. (on the Application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, 
[2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Mandla (Sewa Singh) v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 2 A.C. 
548 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 14.  The Legal System of the United Kingdom, CHARTERED INST. OF LEGAL EXECS., 
http://www.ilex.org.uk/about_cilex_lawyers/the_uk_legal_system.aspx (last visited May 5, 2012).  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  See generally, e.g., Mandla, 2 A.C. 548.  
 17.  See generally, e.g., Begum, 1 A.C. 100.  
 18.  See generally, e.g., Mandla, 2 A.C. 548; JFS, 2 A.C. 728.  
 19.  Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42.  
 20.  See generally, e.g,, R (on the Application of Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Education 
and Employment [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 A.C. 246 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter 
Williamson].  
 21.  See Begum, 1 A.C., at 113.  
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result, the court has repeatedly not upheld claims for protection for free 
expression of religion if there were any other way an individual could 
practice the religious expression without the inconvenience or hardship that 
generated the lawsuit.22 The British system offers an understanding of 
religion that is tied to a cultural framework based on the adoption of other 
statutes, such as the Race Relations Act, to the plaintiff’s free expression 
plea.23 The interpretations offered by the European Court of Human Rights 
do not change or add to this interpretive framework, as the conclusions 
drawn by the European Court of Human Rights merely uphold the British 
jurisprudence under which the case arose. 
Any substantive discussion concerning the different judicial systems 
used to draw the line between an individual’s right to free expression of his 
or her religious beliefs, and the state’s right to restrict that expression, 
requires an understanding of the ways in which different systems 
characterize the nature of religion. This note seeks to explore the two 
different characterizations of religion offered by the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and how those characterizations are used to protect free 
exercise in both nations.  The American system shows an appreciation for 
religious exercise as a method of individualism, and religious expression is 
something that is undertaken as an individual. The judicial question is 
therefore only whether that individual’s expression has crossed a line into 
conduct that the government has determined to be prohibited. The United 
Kingdom offers a contrasting approach, viewing religion as something 
which is part of a larger cultural and community-based identity. Therefore, 
the validity of the religious expression can be analyzed to determine if it 
fits within the expressions deemed necessary for that community. 
In this paper, I argue that while both of these methods offer valuable 
jurisprudence, the American system’s characterization results in a stronger 
judicial basis of support for free exercise claims. While the British system 
attempts to provide broad protection for free expression, the British system 
is constrained by its need to fit the free exercise claim into a cultural or 
ethnic context. This produces somewhat strained jurisprudence. These 
weaknesses are then compounded in cases brought under the ECHR, 
because the U.K. must rely on the decisions made by the European Court of 
Human Rights whose free exercise decisions offer plaintiffs little hope of 
success. 
The structure of this note is as follows: first, I explain the evolution of 
the United States’ system of protection for free exercise, as well as its 
 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  See generally, e.g., JFS, 2 A.C. 728.  
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current status. I then turn to the British system and describe the various 
ways a free exercise case can be brought in the United Kingdom, as well as 
discuss the outcomes of those cases and possible implications of choosing 
one strategy over another. Third, I analyze three ways in which the 
different methods used by the U.S. and the U.K. to characterize religion 
affect their free exercise jurisprudence, and why the characterization 
offered by the United States provides plaintiffs with a stronger basis for 
judicial support for their free exercise claims. Finally, I offer a brief 
conclusion and summary. 
I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
A. The Constitution and Basic Foundation of Free Exercise 
The foundation for American protection of freedom of expression is 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof.”24 The idea of establishing a government without a 
corresponding state religion was an innovative concept, but one which the 
Founders were eager to embrace,25 particularly given that many early 
settlers to the United States immigrated in order to escape religious 
persecution and several states were founded on freedom of religion.26 The 
intention of the founders appeared to be that individual exercise of religion 
would be enhanced, were religion not tied to the national government, as 
articulated by James Madison: 
 
If a further confirmation of the truth could be wanted, it is to be found in 
the examples furnished by the States, which have abolished their 
religious establishments. I cannot speak particularly of any of the cases 
excepting that of Virg[inia][,] where it is impossible to deny that 
Religion prevails with more zeal, and a more exemplary priesthood than 
it ever did when established and patronized by Public authority.27 
 
The general homogenization of religious practices in early American, 
however, resulted in little use being made of the free exercise clause until 
the late 1800s, when Mormons wishing to continue their practice of 
 
 24.  U.S. CONST. amend I.  
 25.  See generally Letter from James Madison, to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822) (on file with 
the Princeton University Library); Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 6.  
 26.  The Pilgrims coming to America to worship freely, as well as the founding of Pennsylvania 
and Maryland as states which provided religious havens for Quakers and Catholics respectively, are 
requisite parts of any United States History class for grade school children.  
 27.  Letter from James Madison, supra note 25.  
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polygamy after Utah became a U.S. territory relied on its protection.28 The 
Supreme Court, however, swiftly and sharply struck down these 
Constitutional appeals on the grounds that while “Congress cannot pass a 
law for the government of the Territories which shall prohibit the free 
exercise of religion . . . it may safely be said there never has been a time in 
any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against 
society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less 
severity.”29 For the next half century, the rule appeared to be that while no 
state could prohibit religious belief, it could prohibit certain forms of 
religious conduct. 
It was not until the late 1940s that the Supreme Court began to 
articulate what would develop into the contemporary free exercise 
jurisprudence. In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
upheld a law permitting tax-raised funds to pay for the busing of all New 
Jersey children to school, including Catholic schoolchildren attending 
parochial schools.30 Despite their approval of state funds being used in this 
manner, the Court expressed for the first time its view that a “wall of 
separation” must exist between church and state.31 The Court maintained, 
however, that while there was to be a “wall” between church and state so as 
to avoid the establishment of religion, the state “cannot hamper its citizens 
in the free exercise of their own religion . . . it cannot exclude 
individual[s] . . . because of their faith or lack of it, from receiving the 
benefits of public welfare legislation.”32 This statement by the Court meant 
that citizens of states were free to take advantage of public legislation 
which would facilitate a citizen’s individual exercise of his or her religion, 
without such action being considered an endorsement or “establishment” of 
that religion. 
B. Sherbert v. Verner 
It was not until the 1960s that the Supreme Court developed a firm test 
for determining when the government might curtail an individual’s right to 
free expression of religion, whereby an infringement of free exercise rights 
could only be justified by “a compelling state interest in the regulation of a 
subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.’”33 In 1963, a 
 
 28.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 
(1890); Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).  
 29.  Reynolds, 98 U.S.at 162, 165.  
 30.  Everson, 330, U.S. at 18 (1947).                                                                      
 31.  Id. at 18.  
 32.  Id. at 16.  
 33.  Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.  
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case was brought by a Seventh-Day Adventist appellant, arguing that the 
state of South Carolina could not deny her unemployment compensation on 
the grounds that her refusal to work on Saturdays, the holy day of her faith, 
meant that she had refused employment without good cause.34 The South 
Carolina Supreme Court had found that her “ineligibility infringed no 
constitutional liberties” because the statute requiring her not to refuse 
employment without good cause placed no restrictions on her freedom of 
belief or the free exercise of her religion.35 In contrast, the appellant argued 
that the free exercise clause should prevent the state from disallowing her 
benefits.36 
The Court noted that while the government could not regulate 
religious beliefs, it could regulate conduct when the “actions so regulated 
have . . . posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order,”37 
but only if the burden on free exercise resulted from a “compelling state 
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power 
to regulate.”38 Moreover, if the burden on free exercise was the effect of a 
law which impeded religious observance, or discriminated between 
religions, such a law was invalid even if the burden on free exercise was 
indirect.39 
The Court found that the appellant’s disqualification indirectly 
burdened her free exercise because the disqualification exerted severe 
pressure on her to abandon her religious beliefs.40 In addition, South 
Carolina had specifically exempted Sunday observers from having to make 
a similar choice.41 Finally, the Court found there was no compelling state 
interest behind the enforcement of the statute, as appellees had suggested 
only that people requesting unemployment might falsely claim religious 
objections to Saturday work.42 The Court found that even if this was a 
legitimate concern, the state would have to show that “no alternative forms 
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First 
Amendment rights.”43 Through Sherbert, the Supreme Court put the burden 
on the state to prove that a limitation on free expression was the only 
 
 34.  Id. at 399-400.  
 35.  Id. at 401.  
 36.  See id. at 402.  
 37.  Id. at 402-03.  
 38.  Id. at 403.  
 39.  Id. at 404.  
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 406 (noting that as the state had passed a law permitting textile workers 
“conscientiously opposed to Sunday work” to not lose their job or their seniority by their refusal).  
 42.  Id. at 407.  
 43.  Id. (emphasis added).   
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solution to a compelling problem. 
C. Wisconsin v. Yoder 
The Supreme Court expounded upon the Sherbert compelling interest 
test in Wisconsin v. Yoder and maintained the Court’s legal conviction that 
an individual’s First Amendment right to free exercise of his or her religion 
was something courts should strongly protect. In Yoder, the defendants 
were Old Order Amish parents who refused to send their children to public 
school beyond 8th grade44 on the grounds that it was against the tenants of 
their faith.45 Wisconsin had recently introduced a law mandating that all 
children attend public school until age 16, and the Amish parents were 
found to be in violation of this law.46 The Amish parents appealed under 
the First Amendment, arguing that it was within the free exercise of their 
religion to refuse to allow their children to attend public school after 8th 
grade.47 
In Yoder, the Supreme Court applied the Sherbert test, repeating that 
“activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to 
regulation by the States . . . [but] there are areas of conduct protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause . . . [that are] beyond the power of the State to 
control.”48 In contrast, however, to their statements in Sherbert, which 
focused almost exclusively on the state’s action, in Yoder the Court spent 
significant time establishing that the Amish peoples’ beliefs were sincere, 
that they were the product of a long and notable religious tradition,49 and 
that there would be no ill effects resulting from the decision to permit the 
Amish to remove their children from formal school after completion of 8th 
grade.50 The Court noted that “we must be careful to determine whether the 
Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable 
and interdependent.”51 This wording was quite different from Sherbert, 
which made no attempt to determine whether the respondent’s religious 
belief in Saturday as the Sabbath was “inseparable and interdependent” 
from a mode of life which required her to not work on the Sabbath. 
 
 44.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).  
 45.  Id. at 209 (noting that Old Order Amish communities believed children’s attendance at high 
school was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life).  
 46.  Id. at 207-08.  
 47.  Id. at 208-09.  
 48.  Id. at 220.  
 49.  Id. at 210 (explaining that the Amish have rejected material culture since the 16th century, 
and that the objection to formal education is grounded in this belief).  
 50.  See id. at 212 (“[T]he Amish succeed in preparing their high school age children to be 
productive members of the Amish community.”).  
 51.  Id. at 215.  
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The Court clearly stated that Amish parents were permitted, under the 
free exercise clause, to refuse to send their children to public school after 
8th grade.52 However, the Court seemed to wrestle with the reasoning 
behind this ruling, resulting in a lengthy discussion on the history and 
authenticity of the Amish faith, and their repeated declarations that 
imposing the public education requirement on Old Order Amish would 
severely limit their religious expression.53 In addition, the Court appeared 
eager to show that the state’s interest in children remaining in school until 
16 could be achieved in other ways.54 Yoder appeared to solidify the 
“compelling state interest” test, ensuring that the state would carry a heavy 
burden when attempting to show the necessity of burdening free exercise of 
religion. 
D. Employment Division v. Smith 
With the application of the “compelling interest” test in Yoder, it 
appeared that the Supreme Court had firmly established the American law, 
for both state and federal courts, as regards the free exercise clause. The 
evolution of the Supreme Court, however, from a conglomerate of more 
liberal justices in the 1960s and 1970s, to the more conservative Rehnquist 
Court in the early 1990s, 55 created a dramatic shift in free exercise 
interpretation, notably expressed in Employment Division v. Smith. 
The ingestion of peyote, a form of cactus,56 was deemed by Oregon to 
be possession of a “controlled substance” in violation of the Federal 
Controlled Substances Act,57 even when such ingestion was part of a 
religious ceremony where the drug was used as a sacrament.58 Respondents 
were fired from their jobs and denied unemployment benefits after having 
ingested peyote as part of a Native American Church ceremony.59 Upon 
 
 52.  Id. at 234.  
 53.  Id. at 219 (“[T]he unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and religious 
history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and 
regulating respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State's requirement 
of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free 
exercise of respondents' religious beliefs.”).  
 54.  Id. at 224 (noting that should Amish children choose to leave the church, their practical 
training would make it unlikely that they would become burdens on society).  
 55.  Chief Justice Rehnquist began as an Associate Justice on the court in 1972, was promoted to 
Chief Justice in 1986 and led an increasingly conservative bloc of justices. See William H. Rehnquist, 
THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-
court/chief-justices/william-rehnquist-1986-2005/. 
 56.  OMAR C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY 3 (University of Oklahoma Press 1987).  
 57.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.  
 58.  Id. at 874-75.  
 59.  Id. at 874.  
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first examination, it appeared that the Smith case would follow the 
“compelling interest” test expressed in Yoder, and the state would be forced 
to establish compelling arguments for why religious peyote use should not 
be permitted. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, however, declared that the 
Supreme Court had “never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse 
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that 
the State is free to regulate”60 and that the free exercise clause did not 
excuse an individual from an “obligation to comply with a valid and neutral 
law of general applicability.”61 
In addition, the Court stated that “[t]he only decisions in which we 
have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free 
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with 
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the 
press.”62 The Court further noted that Smith did not present this form of 
dual claim.63 In respect to the Sherbert test, the Court wrote, “We have 
never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test 
except the denial of unemployment compensation[,]”64 and commented 
that, in recent cases, it had declined to even apply the Sherbert test.65 The 
Court held instead that Sherbert was inapplicable to free exercise 
challenges to prohibitions on particular forms of religious conduct.66 
The Court’s decision in Smith produced severe protests by religious 
groups and an almost immediate response from Congress. A coalition of 
both left- and right-wing religious rights groups67 formed to request 
Congressional action. Within two years of Smith, Congress passed the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which restored the Sherbert 
test as an acceptable defense for people who found their free exercise of 
religion burdened by governmental legislation.68 RFRA specifically stated 
 
 60.  Id. at 878-79.  
 61.  Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 62.  Id. at 881.  
 63.  Id. at 882.  
 64.  Id. at 883.  
 65.  Id. at 883-84.  
 66.  Id. at 884-86.  
 67.  The coalition included such unfamiliar bedfellows as the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
National Association of Evangelicals, the Southern Baptist Convention, the Mormon Church, and the 
American Jewish Congress. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, THE 
NEW YORK TIMES, (Nov. 17, 1993), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-signs-
law-protecting-religious-practices.html?pagewanted=1&src=pm.  
 68.  Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) § 2(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
[hereinafter RFRA] (“The purposes of [the Act] are— (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set 
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to 
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that in order to burden religion, the government must prove that the burden 
“(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the 
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.69 Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection of the “compelling 
interest” test for free exercise, it appeared that public opinion and 
Congressional legislation had been able to preserve the Sherbert test. 
E. Development of the Current Bifurcated State and Federal System 
The Supreme Court, however, was not inclined to have its decision in 
Smith dismissed so quickly through an act of Congress. In City of Boerne v. 
Flores, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio applied for a building 
permit to enlarge his church.70 When the permit was denied under an 
ordinance preserving historic buildings, he brought suit under RFRA to 
challenge the ordinance,71 but the District Court ruled that, as applied to 
state laws, RFRA was not a proper exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power 
to enforce the 14th Amendment.72 
The Supreme Court agreed with the District Court, noting that 
“Congress’ power under Section 5 . . . extends only to enforcing the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . not the power to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation.”73 The Court noted that RFRA 
appeared to “attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections . . . 
[which] apply to every agency and official of the Federal, State and local 
Governments,”74 which it found to be highly in excess of the forms of 
Congressional action permitted under the Constitution. In addition, the 
Court worried that “[t]he stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflect 
a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the 
legitimate end to be achieved”75 and concluded that “the provisions of the 
federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority.”76 City of 
Boerne therefore created a bifurcated system, wherein free exercise claims 
brought under state law would be subject to the Supreme Court’s test of 
 
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to 
provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by 
government.”).  
 69.  RFRA, supra note 69, at 3(b)(1),(2).  
 70.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 74.  Id. at 532.  
 75.  Id. at 533.  
 76.  Id. at 536.  
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Formal Neutrality, as explain in Smith,77 while free exercise claims brought 
under federal law would still be subject to the Sherbert test as described in 
RFRA. 
The right to bring a free exercise claim against federal law under 
RFRA was upheld in O Centro Espirita v. Gonzales, where a minority 
Brazilian religious sect who practiced in Florida was permitted, as part of a 
religious ritual, to drink tea which included a hallucinogenic plant.78 The 
Court noted that under RFRA, the government must establish (1) a 
compelling government interest in burdening an individual’s free exercise 
of religion, and (2) the burden must be the least restrictive method of 
furthering that interest.79 The Court concluded that the government’s 
interest in preventing the diversion of the tea from the church members to 
recreational users was a slippery-slope argument not compelling enough to 
restrict the church’s use of the tea.80 In doing so, the Court affirmed the use 
of RFRA as a tool for courts to recognize exceptions to federal laws which 
infringe on free exercise,81 thereby maintaining the Sherbert test as the 
legitimate standard for courts to apply when dealing with federal 
regulations. 
As a result of the evolution of American common law, the United 
States currently applies the Sherbert test to any federal law deemed to 
impede the free exercise of religion. The federal government must, 
therefore, show that (1) there was a compelling government interest for the 
enactment of the law and (2) the law which created a burden on free 
exercise must be the least restrictive method of furthering that government 
interest. However, with the exception of those areas covered by the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 82 state 
laws are still governed by the Smith test, which requires only that the law 
be neutral on its face, but permits laws which have the effect of burdening 
free exercise of religion. 
 
 77.  Id. at 536 (“[I]t is this court’s precedent, not RFRA, which must control.”). This is not true of 
all state claims. Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., states are prohibited from imposing burdensome zoning laws on religious 
buildings, and may not impose burdens on the free exercise of religion by state prisoners. This 
provision was upheld in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).  
 78.  O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S. at 423.  
 79.  Id. at 424.  
 80.  Id. at 436.  
 81.  Id. at 434.  
 82.  RLUIPA prevents the imposition of burdensome land use regulations on religious assemblies 
or institutions, and protects the free exercise of religion for institutionalized persons. Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006) 
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II. THE BRITISH SYSTEM 
A. An Overview of the British Legal System 
The United Kingdom’s legal system includes law which applies to all 
four countriesScotland, Ireland, Wales, and England, as well as the bodies 
of laws which are created by and regulate the individual countries.83 There 
is no written constitution in the United Kingdom, and, therefore, law that 
would be considered “constitutional” in other countries arises instead from 
statutes, judicial precedent or common law conventions.84 As a member of 
the European Union, the United Kingdom also incorporates European 
legislation into their judicial system, including the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), and recognizes the jurisdiction of and precedents 
from the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights.85 According to the British House of Lords, if there is a conflict 
between EU law and the law of the United Kingdom, the EU law must be 
supreme.86 The House of Lords was the highest Court of Appeal for Great 
Britain, until the establishment of a Supreme Court in 2005.87 
The Church of England is still the established church of the nation, but 
its power is largely symbolic and its existence appears to neither enhance 
nor impede British protection of free exercise.88 The United Kingdom does 
not currently possess any statutes specifically requiring the state to uphold 
free exercise, though the Equality Act of 2006 includes religion as one of 
its protected characteristics.89 As a result, plaintiffs must rely either on 
another statutory provision which can be adapted to cover free exercise 
claims, or, more recently, bring such claims under the ECHR. 
B. Claims Brought Under the Race Relations Act of 1976 
The Race Relations Act of 1976 (Race Relations Act) was intended to 
provide “racial groups” with an ability to seek relief from discrimination on 
 
 83.  Sarah Carter, A Guide to the UK Legal System, GLOBALEX, (Nov. 2005), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/United_Kingdom.htm#BACKGROUND. The law discussed in 
this note is the general law which governs all four kingdoms, but will be referred to as British law 
because the cases discussed arise under the court system in Great Britain.  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id.  
 87.  Id.  
 88.  See generally Andrew Lynch, The Constitutional Significant of the Church of England in 
LAW AND RELIGION 168-196 (Peter Radan, et al. eds., 2005).  
 89.  The Equality Act, 2006, c. 3 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006 
/3/pdfs/ukpga_20060003_en.pdf.  
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racial grounds.90 The term “racial group” included color, race, nationality, 
and ethnic or national origins of a person.91 Since many religions, and 
particularly minority religions, are in some way tied to ethnic groups, the 
expansion of the definition of “racial group” allowed people to bring free 
exercise claims under the Race Relations Act, provided they could show 
that their religion was strongly tied to a racial or ethnic component. 
1. Mandla v. Dowell Lee 
In Mandla v. Dowell Lee, a Sikh boy was denied admission to a 
private school on the grounds that the school’s uniform policy did not 
permit the wearing of a turban in school.92 Although such a case could 
clearly be viewed as a free exercise claim, under British law the boy’s 
father brought an action against the school for racial discrimination. The 
father sought a declaration that Sikhs were a racial group under the Race 
Relations Act that wearing a turban was a requirement of the Sikh religion, 
and therefore, his son could not be denied entrance to school based on his 
religious requirement to wear a turban.93 
In order to receive such protection, however, Sikhs had to qualify as a 
racial group under the requirements of the Race Relations Act. The House 
of Lords determined that the phrase “ethnic group,” as used in the Race 
Relations Act, meant that the group “must . . . regard itself, and be regarded 
by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics.”94 
The court then defined seven characteristics of an ethnic group, including 
“a common religion different from that of neighboring groups or from the 
general community surrounding it.”95 Since House of Lords determined 
that Sikhs were “a distinctive and self-conscious community” who fit the 
enumerated characteristics of an ethnic group, discrimination against Sikhs 
was determined to be a violation of the Race Relations Act.96 
One form of discrimination under the Race Relations Act was the 
application of “a requirement or condition which . . . would apply 
equally . . . but . . . is to the detriment of [the] other because [the other] 
 
 90.  Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk 
/ukpga/1976/74/pdfs/ukpga_19760074_en.pdf.  
 91.  Id. at 3(1).  
 92.  Mandla, 2 A.C.559.  
 93.  Id.  
 94.  Id. at 562.  
 95.  Id. (noting that a shared history and cultural tradition were considered “essential” 
characteristics of an ethnic group, while being a minority or an oppressed group, a common 
geographical origin, and common language, common literature and common religion which all differed 
from the surrounding majority were considered “relevant”).  
 96.  Id. at 565.  
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cannot comply with it.”97 The court determined that, since ethnic origins 
were inherited and unalterable, such compliance must be “consistent[] with 
the customs and cultural conditions”98 of the ethnic group. Since wearing a 
turban was a religious condition imposed by Sikh “customs and cultural 
conditions,” a requirement to not wear a turban was a condition the son 
could not comply with, and, therefore, was racially discriminatory.99 
2. R (Watkins-Singh) v. Governing Body of Aberdare Girl’s High School 
Although the ECHR was adopted in 1998 and provided a statute under 
which plaintiffs could bring free exercise claims,100 plaintiffs found it was 
preferable to bring claims under the Race Relations Act when possible, as 
courts were more likely to find in their favor.101 In this case, a young Sikh 
girl was forbidden to wear a Kara, a silver bangle bracelet worn by 
observant Sikhs, to her high school, as such an item was forbidden under 
the school’s dress code policy.102 The Mandla decision had already defined 
Sikhs as an ethnic group, and so the U.K. Supreme Court proceeded with 
an analysis of whether the claimant had a religious obligation stemming 
from her ethnicity to wear the Kara.103 The Court determined that while 
wearing it was not mandatory, the claimant felt it was an extremely 
important indication of her faith.104 
The Court adopted four steps to determine whether the claimant had 
been subjected to indirect discrimination.105 First, the Court determined that 
the “provision, criterion or practice” at issue was the school’s policy 
permitting only one pair of stud earrings to be worn and no other 
jewelry.106 Second, the policy’s effect on the claimant, in prohibiting the 
claimant to practice this aspect of her religion, was compared to the 
policy’s effects on other students whose religious practices were not in 
conflict with the policy.107 Third, the Court found that since the policy did 
 
 97.  Race Relations Act, at 1(1)(b)(iii).  
 98.  Mandla, 2 A.C.566.  
 99.  Id.  
 100.  See generally Human Rights Act, 1998, (U.K.)..  
 101.  See infra Part II.C (discussing British case law appealed under article 9 of the ECHR). See 
generally JFS, 2 A.C. 728; R. (on the Application of Watkins-Singh) v. The Governing Body of 
Aberdare Girls’ High School, [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin), [2008] W.L. 2872609, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2008/1865.html. 
 102.  Watkins-Singh, W.L. 2872609 ¶ 10.  
 103.  See id. ¶ 23-30.  
 104.  Id. ¶ 29.  
 105.  Id. ¶ 38.  
 106.  Id. ¶ 39.  
 107.  Id. ¶ 43.  
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not harm other students whose religious practices were not in controversy 
with the policy, it must examine whether the claimant suffered a “particular 
disadvantage or determinant” by the policy, based on whether “(a) that 
person genuinely believed . . . that wearing this item was a matter of 
exceptional importance to . . . racial identity or . . . religious belief and (b) 
the wearing of this item can be shown objectively to be of exceptional 
importance to his or her religion or race, even if . . . not an actual 
requirement . . . .”108 Fourth, the Court contended that the prohibition 
against wearing the Kara was disproportionate and not justifiable, because 
the Kara was a small item, and the prohibition on wearing it constrained the 
claimant’s religious freedom.109 The claimant should, therefore, be 
permitted to wear the Kara as an expression of her religion as connected to 
her Sikh ethnicity. 
3. R. v. Governing Body of JFS and Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS 
The interconnection between ethnicity and religion was strengthened 
in R. v. Governing Body of JFS and Admissions Appeal Panel of JFS, 
where the Court determined that adoption of certain religions permitted a 
person to adopt a new ethnicity as well. A person could thereby claim the 
protection of the Race Relations Act for their right to free exercise of  their 
newly adopted religion. A teenage boy whose father was ancestrally 
Jewish, but whose mother was an Italian Catholic who had converted to 
Masorti Judaism wished to attend JFS, a public Orthodox Jewish School.110 
The claimant was denied admission because the school required that all 
pupils be of Jewish descent as defined in the Orthodox tradition: each 
pupil’s mother must have either been born Jewish, or have converted to 
Orthodox Judaism.111 
The Court reviewed the Mandla test for ethnicity and determined that 
Jews qualified as an ethnic group. The Court, however, concluded that 
adopting the Jewish faith also automatically granted a person Jewish 
ethnicity as well, because for Jews, religion and ethnicity were 
intertwined.112 Significantly, the Court held that any adoption of the Jewish 
faith, no matter what form (conservative, reform, orthodox, etc.), would 
convey on the convert both the Jewish faith and the Jewish ethnicity.113 As 
 
 108.  Id. ¶ 56.  
 109.  See id. ¶¶ 72-91.  
 110.  JFS, 2 A.C. 744. In the UK it is very common for public, state-supported schools to be 
religiously affiliated and limit their enrollment to members of that religion. 
 111.  Id. at 753.  
 112.  Id.  
 113.  See id.  
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a result, JFS’s refusal to admit the claimant because the claimant was not 
“properly” Jewish was deemed to be direct racial discrimination under the 
Race Relations Act.114 
The claimant wished to freely exercise his religion by requesting 
admission to a school which observed the religious faith that he determined 
he belonged to. The Court deemed that the school could not deny him 
admission based on religious reasons because through his mother’s 
conversion, he acquired both a religion and an ethnicity. His Jewish 
ethnicity protected against the religious discrimination, because it was fully 
imparted regardless of how his mother converted to Judaism. The Court 
repeatedly emphasized that for Jews, “it is almost impossible to distinguish 
between ethnic status and religious status.”115 This case was deemed a free 
exercise case because it barred the school from denying the claimant the 
ability to be viewed as Jewish for purposes of admission standards. 
C. Claims Brought Under the ECHR Art. 9 
The European Convention on Human Rights was incorporated into 
British law through the Human Rights Act of 1998.116 It included Article 9, 
which states:  
 
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.117  
 
For the first time in British law, this gave plaintiffs a statutory provision 
under which they could bring free exercise of religion suits.118 In addition, 
the application of the ECHR meant that British courts could now rely on 
the precedents of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights, known as the Strasbourg Court.119 It is nonetheless 
questionable whether this actually provides more protection for free 
exercise, as the Strasbourg Court has consistently upheld the rights of states 
to restrict free exercise of religion, as long as the state can establish a 
 
 114.  Id. at 754.  
 115.  Id. at 752.  
 116.   See generally Human Rights Act, 1998, (U.K.).  
 117.  European Convention on Human Rights art 9, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS 5 [hereinafter ECHR] 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?MA=3&CM=7&CL=ENG.                                                                            
 118.  See EDWARD J. EBERLE, CHURCH AND STATE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 34 (Ashgate Publishing, 
2011).  
 119.  Id. 
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legitimate reason for doing so.120 
1. R v. Williamson 
Since 1987, school teachers in state schools or schools which received 
public funding were banned from administering corporal punishment to 
children.121 The claimants, however, adhered to a fundamentalist form of 
Christianity, which prescribed corporal punishment as an appropriate 
disciplinary action for misbehaving children.122 They were the head 
teachers, teachers and parents of children at four Christian schools who 
claimed that the statutory ban interfered with their right to freely exercise 
their religious beliefs.123 The Court notes that “religious faiths call for more 
than belief,”124 but notes that the “freedom to manifest belief is qualified” 
under Article 9 in order to maintain a peaceful pluralistic society.125 
Where a claimant’s professed belief is at issue, Article 9 requires the 
Court to inquire into the genuineness of the claimant’s belief so as to 
ensure that the religious belief is made in good faith.126 The Court, 
however, is not to inquire into the validity of the espoused belief.127 The 
standard requirements for a belief is that it must be consistent with basic 
standards of human dignity or integrity, it must relate to matters that are 
more than trivial, it must possess an adequate degree of seriousness and 
importance, and it must be coherent.128 Though the Court considered 
whether a belief in corporal punishment could be considered inconsistent 
with basic standards of human integrity, it chose to consider the belief 
valid.129 
Although the Court recognized that the ban on corporal punishment 
acted as an interference on a valid religious belief, it deemed that 
interference justified because it was, within the meaning of Article 9, 
interference “necessary in a democratic society . . . for the protection of the 
 
 120.  See generally e.g., Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, App. No. 27417/95, ECHR (2000), 
available at http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=172; Karaduman v. Turkey, 
App. No. 16278/90, ECHR (1993), available at http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php? 
DocumentID=4237; Ahmad v. United Kingdom, 4 EHRR 126 (1981); Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 
44774/98, ECHR (2010), available at http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID= 
2103.  
 121.  Williamson, 2 A.C., at 253-54.  
 122.  Id. at 255.  
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id. at 257.  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id. at 258.  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id. at 258-59.  
 129.  See id. at 260.  
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rights and freedoms of others.”130 The Court explained that the statute 
pursued the legitimate aim of protecting vulnerable children, because it was 
known that corporal punishment deliberately inflicted physical violence 
and the legislation was intended to protect against harmful effects that 
might result from such violence.131 The Court also noted that the statute 
was not disproportionate, as parents were still free to administer mild 
corporal punishment to their children within the privacy of their homes.132 
The Court concluded that the legislature, while bound to respect the 
parents’ religious beliefs, was permitted to determine that manifesting 
those beliefs was not in the best interests of children, and therefore, a broad 
social policy against such practices was warranted.133 
2. R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School 
The R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High 
School134 decision was notable for its extensive use of precedent from the 
European Court of Human Rights and for its holding that not only can the 
state determine limitations on the free expression of religion, but such 
responsibilities can also be delegated to sub-entities, such as schools, and 
these entities’ decisions concerning the limitations of free expression are to 
be respected. The claimant in Begum attended a secondary school whose 
dress code included the shalwar kameez, a Middle Eastern garment, as a 
uniform option for Muslim female students.135 For the first few years at 
school, the claimant wore the shalwar kameez, but after living with her 
older brother, came to school and stated that she wished to wear a jilbab, a 
more conservative Muslim garment.136 The school denied her request, and 
the claimant brought suit under Article 9 of the ECHR.137 
In making their decision, the Court cited extensively from Strasbourg 
Court precedent, noting that “[t]he Strasbourg institutions have not been at 
all ready to find an interference with the right to manifest religious 
belief . . . where a person has voluntarily accepted . . . [a] role which does 
not accommodate that practice . . . and there are other means . . . to practice 
or observe his or her religion . . .”138 Since the claimant had been given full 
opportunity to attend other schools where she could wear the jilbab, the 
 
 130.  Id. at 264 (quoting ECHR, supra note 117, art. 9).  
 131.  Id.  
 132.  See id. at 264-65.  
 133.  Id. at 265.  
 134.  [2007] 1 A.C.100. 
 135.  I., at 108.  
 136.  Id. at 108-09.  
 137.  Id. at 111. 
 138.  Id. at 112-13.  
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Court found that upholding the school’s rule against a claim for free 
exercise was supported by precedent.139 The Court also found that under 
British law, the school’s decision to create and enforce a dress code which 
sought a middle ground between varying Muslim traditions of dress was 
justifiable.140 As to the issue of proportionality, the Court noted that the 
school “had taken immense pains to devise a uniform . . . which respected 
Muslim beliefs . . . in an inclusive, unthreatening and uncompetitive 
way.”141 Finally, the Court concluded that the “power of decision” had been 
given to the school as it was “best placed to exercise it” and, therefore, 
should be trusted to make appropriate decisions, even if those decisions 
infringed upon free exercise.142 
3. Eweida v. British Airways 
In a case which was popularized by the news media,143 a Christian 
working as a check-in staff member of British Airways requested the right 
to visibly wear a silver cross during work.144 Her request was denied under 
BA’s dress code policy.145 The Court found that the airline’s position was 
justified because it had the right to create a basic dress code for its 
employees, and the dress code did not place Christians in general at a 
disadvantage.146 The Court thereby appeared to uphold its view that 
institutions such as a school (in Begum) or an employer could make 
reasonable decisions concerning various requirements, including a dress 
code, by which its employees, students, or people who utilized its services 
had to abide. 
The Court continued its precedent of showing strong favoritism 
towards institutional discretion by repeating its standard that the 
institution’s policy could only be overcome if the appellant showed a strict 
religious duty to wear a certain item or act in a certain way, and an absolute 
inability to receive the same or similar service or benefit if the appellant’s 
claim was denied. The Court noted that there was no suggestion that the 
claimant’s beliefs required her to wear a cross.147 In addition, no precedent 
 
 139.  Id. at 114.  
 140.  Id. at 108.  
 141.  Id. at 117 (appearing deeply concerned that allowing one girl to wear the jilbab may create 
pressure for other Muslim girls to wear such garment who otherwise would choose not to wear it).  
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Shirley Chaplin and Nadia EweidaTtakeCcrossFfight to Europe, BBC NEWS, (Feb. 12, 2010, 
12:41 GMT), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-17346834.  
 144.  Eweida v. BA [2010] EWCA (Civ) 80, [2010] I.C.R. 890 [892].  
 145.  Id. 
 146.  See id. at 899-900.  
 147.  Id. at 900-01.  
COLLINS FINAL VERSION 4(DO NOT DELETE) 5/29/2013  3:19 PM 
2013] RELIGION: INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION OR INTERTWINED WITH CULTURE? 355 
under Article 9 of the ECHR supported the claimant’s position, as she was 
free to seek other employment where she could wear a cross.148 
Finally, the Court appeared to add a new requirement for free exercise 
claims when they stated that “disadvantage to a single individual arising 
out of her wish to manifest her faith in a particular way”149 was not 
sufficient to be deemed religious discrimination and necessitate a ruling 
under Article 9. The Court noted that “the detriment of [the appellant] was 
suffered by her alone: neither . . . was anyone else similarly 
disadvantaged.”150 This new requirement reinforces the necessity of 
proving that the action at issue is a strict religious duty imposed on all 
members of that religious group. Without the ability to prove this, most 
free exercise claims will fail because they would be deemed “disadvantages 
to a single individual,” rather than religious discrimination against an entire 
group. 
III. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON 
A. Characterization through Case Law 
In the American system, the characterization of free exercise as an 
individual right is evidenced in both the constitutional protection and 
statutory protections. The inclusion of free exercise in the amendment 
protecting freedom of speech and the press indicates that the founders 
conceived of free exercise as a right which one exercised as an individual, 
much like an individual’s right to speak.151 The introduction to RFRA 
shows that when the Supreme Court had, in the view of the American 
people, abrogated their responsibility to uphold an individual’s right to free 
exercise, Congress intervened to ensure that any burden on free exercise be 
done only out of great necessity.152 They did not, however, qualify this 
protection with any stipulations concerning the nature, authenticity or 
validity of the religious belief. 
In addition, while the facial neutrality test of Smith appeared to reduce 
the level of protection for free exercise, the breadth of its scope is evidence 
 
 148.  Id. at 897-98.  
 149.  Id. at 901.  
 150.  Id. at 899.   
 151.  See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 6; Letter from James Madison, supra note 
25. 
 152.  See RFRA §§ 2(a)(1)-(b)(2) (stating “[T]he framers of the Constitution, recognizing free 
exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the 
Constitution . . . governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling 
justification...the purposes of this Act are . . . to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious 
exercise is substantially burdened by government.”) 
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that the Supreme Court chose to uphold its characterization of religious 
expression as an individual matter, because they provided no cultural or 
ethnic-based exceptions to Smith. It has been argued that Smith “draw[s] 
upon a long history of official United States accommodation of religious 
practice” which favors majority religions.153 Even if this were true, the 
favoring of majority religions is different than characterizing religion as 
one element within the greater framework of a majority or minority culture. 
Moreover, the Smith test has been understood by some scholars to 
“discourage government hostility to religion”154 on the grounds that “the 
inquiry into neutrality is designed to place religious claimants on par with 
other claimants in society [particularly when concerning] government 
aid.”155 Part of being placed “on par with other claimants” is that religion is 
viewed as its own separate element, to be protected or infringed on apart 
from other protected elements (i.e. gender, ethnicity, race). Though the 
Smith test may have resulted in a lack of judicial protection, its creation 
indicates that the Court’s characterization of religion as an individual right 
did not change. 
The Smith test has now been partially overruled by RFRA.156 In 
dealing with facially neutral laws, the Court has determined that not only is  
mere facial neutrality not determinative,157 but that “the effect of a law in 
its real operation is strong evidence of its object.”158 Should it be 
determined that a law was designed to be “an impermissible attempt to 
target petitioners and their religious practices,” such a law will not be 
permitted to stand, even though it can be deemed facially neutral.159 Again, 
there is no stipulation that the religious practices be appropriate or valid, 
merely that the plaintiffs sincerely hold these practices to be religious.160 
The United Kingdom provides statutory protection for free exercise 
claims under the Equality Act of 2006 and the Race Relations Act of 
1976,161 as well as Human Rights Act of 1998 which incorporated the 
 
 153.  See EBERLE, supra note 119, at 161 (noting that in Mueller v. Allen, formal neutrality enabled 
the court to uphold a statute allowing taxpayers to deduct expenses from gross income up to a certain 
amount if they chose to send their children to a private, usually religious, school).  
 154.  Id. at 157. 
 155.  Id. at 156-57. 
 156.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (stating that “it is this Court’s 
precedent, not RFRA, which must control”); Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434 (2006) (stating that RFRA would apply to federal laws) 
 157.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993). 
 158.  See id. at 535. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See id. at 531 (noting that a petitioner’s religious assertion “cannot be deemed bizarre or 
incredible”). 
 161.  See EBERLE, supra note 119, at 33, 35. 
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ECHR.162 British courts have not decided free exercise cases under the 
Equality Act of 2006, choosing instead to protect minority religious rights 
under the Race Relations Act.163 Implicit in the application of this statute is 
the requirement that any religious practice protected under it be deemed 
part of an ethnic group.164 Such a characterization allows British courts to 
show respect for religious practices which are an integral part of a 
particular culture.165 This characterization subordinates religion to race and 
ethnicity. Religious expression is not viewed as something which an 
individual undertakes on his or her own, but rather something which is 
practiced within a greater community.166 In the end, the religious exercise is 
protected because it is part of cultural or ethnic community, but it is not 
protected on its own merits as an individual right. 
As a result, while minority religions which are strongly attached to a 
particular culture and ethnicity will fit Mandla definition of an ethnic group 
as a “distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics,”167 such a 
standard does not work as easily when dealing with large, diverse religions 
such as Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. These larger religions transcend 
the requirement of a “distinct community” because their adherents are 
widespread and extremely culturally and ethnically diverse. When the 
British courts attempted to apply the Mandla test to free exercise claims 
brought by adherents of these religions, the result was a somewhat strained 
judicial interpretation. In JFS, for example, the British Supreme Court 
ruled that all people who claim to be Jewish, regardless of their original 
background, the form of Judaism they practice, or actual ancestry, were to 
be deemed part of a single Jewish ethnic group.168 The British Supreme 
Court was clearly seeking to preserve the plaintiff’s ability to freely 
identify himself as Jewish for the purpose of seeking admission to JFS, in 
straining the Race Relations Act to accommodate this type of free exercise. 
However, in straining the court’s jurisprudence so as to make Judaism into 
an ethnicity, the decision resulted in a severe requirement that religion be 
subordinated to another protected class such as ethnicity. In addition, the 
 
 162.   See generally Human Rights Act, 1998, (U.K.)..  
 163.  See generally, R. (on the Application of E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15; 
[2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Mandla (Sewa Singh) v. Dowell Lee [1983] 2 A.C. 
548 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).  
 164.  See Race Relations Act art. 1(1)(b)(ii). 
 165.  See generally Mandla, 2 A.C. 548. 
 166.  See generally id.; R. (on the Application of Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of 
Denbigh High School, [2006] UKHL 15; [2007] 1 A.C. 100 (H.L.) [114] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 167.  Mandla, 2 A.C. at 562. 
 168.  See JFS, 2 A.C. at 753 (stating that “whatever their racial, national and ethnic background, 
conversion unquestionably brings the convert within the Mandla definition of Jewish ethnicity”). 
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court’s disregard of the definition of “Jewish” offered by the U.K.’s Chief 
Rabbi and their adoption of their own definition solidified the court’s 
position as the ultimate judge of whether or not a religious expression was 
valid enough to receive protection. As a result, while British courts are as 
equally open to hearing free exercise claims as American courts, the 
characterization of religion as something which is a part of an ethnic group 
results in a much higher bar for plaintiffs to overcome. Moreover, the 
addition of the requirement that the religious expression be valid and 
necessary means that many claims will fail, particularly those brought by 
members of larger religions, such as Christianity and Islam, whose 
traditions are so diverse that it is hard to determine whether or not a certain 
action is truly “necessary.”169 
B. Characterization and Inquiry into Sincerity of Belief and Necessity of 
Practice 
The contrasting characterizations of religion offered by the British and 
American courts have resulted in a different view of the scope of judicial 
functions performed by the courts when they hear a free exercise case. In 
the United States, the Supreme Court’s understanding of religion as an 
individual right has led to the requirement that there be no inquiry into the 
sincerity of the plaintiff’s beliefs, nor any analysis of whether the practice 
is an integral part of the plaintiff’s belief system or is widely adhered to 
among followers of that belief system.170 Since religion is an individual 
matter, it follows that individuals can hold different views on what is or is 
not a religious duty or what actions should be performed as an exercise of 
that religion. The purpose of the Court is merely to determine whether or 
not the plaintiff’s right of free exercise was violated, not whether or not the 
plaintiff’s claim to that right was valid. In contrast, the U.K.’s 
understanding of religion as an element of a broader cultural and ethnic 
community permits courts the freedom to inquire into the validity and 
authenticity of a claimed form of religious expression.171 Courts may 
request advice from religious community leaders as to whether the person’s 
faith is authentic and whether their free exercise claim is an action deemed 
“necessary” for the adherents of that religion.172 
 
 169.  See, e.g., Eweida v. BA [2010] EWCA (Civ) 80, [2010] I.C.R. 890 [892]; Begum, 1 A.C. 100. 
 170.  See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
 171.  See Williamson, 2 A.C. at 258.  
 172.  See, e.g., JFS, 2 A.C. at 754 (citing the Registrar of the London Beth Din and the Chief Rabbi 
of the UK as authorities who were questioned concerning how a person would be defined as a Jew); 
Watkins-Singh, W.L. 2872609, ¶ 23 (citing Professor Eleanor Nesbitt as a witness concerning Sikh 
traditions and customs).  
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In the United States, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that 
“Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs . . . the guarantee 
of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the 
members of a religious sect . . . [and] Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.”173 Assuming that religious beliefs and practices are 
individual expressions, it follows that a religious practice does not need to 
be “acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others” in order to 
merit First Amendment protection.174 A practice may even be deemed 
“bizarre or incredible” without falling outside of the First Amendment.175 
While there are some cases where the Court will discuss the petitioner’s 
beliefs in detail, the Court may only use these discussions to establish 
whether the issue at hand is one in which the government has a compelling 
interest and can therefore regulate. For example, in Yoder, the Court 
discussed the history and structure of the Amish faith to articulate their 
belief that the Amish educational system would adequately prepare Amish 
children for adult life, and, therefore, the Amish could freely exercise their 
right to have children refrain from attending formal school after 8th 
grade.176 In addition, in Smith the Court refrained from discussing whether 
the plaintiffs were required to use peyote as an element of their faith, and 
whether the belief that they had to ingest the drug was in accordance with 
the wider Native American community’s stance on peyote.177 
In contrast, since British law views religion as an element within a 
larger framework of culture and ethnicity, British courts are permitted to 
make significant inquiries into the sincerity with which the claimant hold 
the religious view, the validity of that form of religious expression, and the 
level of duty the religion imposes on its members to take that particular 
action. For analyzing sincerity, the British Supreme Court has stated that 
“when the genuineness of a claimant’s professed belief is in issue in the 
proceedings, the Court will inquire into and decide this issue as an issue of 
fact.”178 In addition, to be protected under article 9 of the ECHR, a belief 
must satisfy a list of characteristics including “consisten[cy] with basic 
standards of human dignity or integrity” and “an adequate degree of 
seriousness.”179 
 
 173.  Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.  
 174.  Id. at 714.  
 175. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). 
 176.  See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 212 (stating “the testimony...showed that the Amish succeed in 
preparing their high school age children to be productive members of the Amish community”).  
 177.  See generally Smith, 494 U.S. 872.  
 178.  Williamson, 2 A.C. at 258.  
 179.  Id. at 258-59. The Court attempted to mitigate potential favoritism of majority religions by 
noting that “threshold requirements should not . . . deprive minority beliefs of . . . protection.” 
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In order to determine the authenticity of a religious belief, British 
courts can request information from religious leaders and other 
authoritative members of the community.180 However, the court remains the 
ultimate judge of whether or not a belief is “necessary” enough to be given 
free exercise protection. For example, in Watkins-Singh the Court 
determined that the petitioner should be granted free exercise protection to 
wear her Kara because it was a common expression of observance among 
Sikhs, even though the petitioner’s wearing of the Kara was not required by 
Sikhism as she had not been fully initiated by a guru.181 The court’s 
decision to seek outside advice concerning the necessity of the practice can 
benefit smaller religions whose views and actions are fairly consistent. 
When dealing with large religions like Christianity or Islam, however, this 
can result in a plaintiff receiving little protection. In British Airways, the 
petitioner claimed that wearing a visible silver cross was an integral part of 
her practice of Christianity.182 The Court denied her claim noting that 
“neither [the claimant] nor any witness . . . suggested that the visible 
wearing of a cross was more than a personal preference . . . there was no 
suggestion that her religious belief, however profound, called for it.”183 In 
this case, the court drew a distinction between an action which the plaintiff 
claim was an integral part of her individual practice of Christianity, and the 
status of that action as a required method of religious expression for the 
greater Christian community. While the British system still offers 
protection for free exercise claims, the inquiry into a petitioners’ sincerity 
and the religious legitimacy of their action risks alienating people for 
whom sincerity is difficult to prove, and adherents to religions which 
contain a diverse number of traditions, any one of which might be deemed 
necessary by some practitioners and unnecessary or a mere personal 
preference by others. 
C. The ECHR and Broad Statutory Protections 
With the passage of the U.K. Human Rights Act in 1998184 which 
incorporated the ECHR into British law,185 British citizens were given the 
statutory provision of Article 9 under which they could sue for free 
exercise rights.186 It is true that in some ways Article 9 can be seen as a 
 
 180.  See, e.g., JFS, 2 A.C., at 754; Watkins-Singh, W.L. 2872609, ¶ 23.  
 181.  See Watkins-Singh, W.L. 2872609, ¶ 29. 
 182.  See British Airways, I.C.R., at 900-01.  
 183.  Id.  
 184.  EBERLE, supra note 119, at 32.  
 185.  CARTER, supra note 84.  
 186.  See generally Human Rights Act, supra note 19. 
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parallel to the U.S. protections established in RFRA, as both provide a 
broad, statute-based provision which parties can sue under for the right to 
free exercise. However, the jurisprudence surrounding these statutes 
reflects the distinctive characterizations of religion held by the United 
States. and the United Kingdom. 
Since the Supreme Court has clearly stated that the United States 
looks only to precedent within the nation’s court system itself, and not to 
any form of international law, claims brought in U.S. courts will be subject 
only to the jurisprudence developed by American courts.187 Therefore, 
under RFRA and its case law, free exercise may not to be disturbed unless 
the government can establish that the disturbance “(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”188 As part of the 
European Union, however, U.K. courts must also recognize jurisprudence 
developed under EU courts, including the European Court of Human 
Rights.189 The text of Article 9 allows free exercise of religion to be 
curtailed by “such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.”190 These terms appear to place the burden on the government to 
show the validity of its limitations on free exercise, similar to the way 
RFRA requires the U.S. government to establish a compelling 
governmental interest. However, the inclusion of terms such as “public 
safety,” “public order,” and “health or morals” has allowed the  European 
Court of Human Rights to establish a much broader interpretation of state 
interests that takes precedent over an individual’s right to free exercise. 
Under U.S. law, the government must show there was no viable 
alternative method of action that the government could have taken so as not 
to interfere with the individual’s right to free exercise.191 The Supreme 
Court has stated that “RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that 
the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the 
challenged law “to the person” –  the particular claimant whose sincere 
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”192 Furthermore, the 
Court announced that “we must searchingly examine the interests that the 
 
 187.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010) (stating that “judgments of other nations and 
the international community are not dispositive”).  
 188.  RFRA §§ 3(b)(1), (2).  
 189.  See Begum, 1 A.C., at 113.  
 190.  ECHR, art 9.2.  
 191.  See RFRA § 3(b)(2).  
 192.  O Centro Espirita, 546 U.S., at 430-31.  
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State seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to those objectives that 
would flow from recognizing the claimed . . . exemption.”193 
In contrast, the Strasbourg Court has strongly established that before a 
country will be required to permit free exercise, the plaintiff must establish 
that there is no alternative measure or solution which would permit the 
plaintiff to continue his or her life while still freely expressing his or her 
religion. Such alternative solutions are extremely broad. For example, the 
Strasbourg Court held the following as viable alternatives that rendered 
Article 9 claims moot: the ability to leave the church and no longer serve as 
a clergyman,194 the ability to seek and accept another form of employment 
which would permit duties of religious observance,195 the ability to attend a 
private university which permitted the wearing of a headscarf, instead of 
attending the public university which banned headscarves,196 the ability to 
resign one’s job rather than be forced to work during a Holy Day,197 and the 
ability to import ritually slaughtered meat from another country, instead of 
slaughtering it oneself.198 
The European Court of Human Rights appears to interpret the core of 
Article 9 as a protection only in cases where the appellant would have 
absolutely no alternative way to freely exercise his or her religion. As a 
result of this incredibly high standard, plaintiffs bringing cases before 
British courts which look to the decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights will find it very difficult to establish enough necessity to make the 
British courts require that the activity be permitted. Since plaintiffs almost 
 
 193.  Yoder, 406 U.S., at 221. 
 194.  See X v. Denmark, App. No. 7374/76, ECHR (1976), The Law ¶ 1 (stating “their right to 
leave the church guarantees their freedom of religion in case they oppose its teachings.”). 
 195.  See Ahmad, 4 EHRR 126, ¶15 (stating “the applicant remained free to resign if and when he 
found that his 
teaching obligations conflicted with his religious duties.”). 
 196.  See Karaduman, App. No. 16278/90, at The Law  ¶2 (stating “The Commission takes the 
view that by choosing to pursue her higher education in a secular university a student submits to those 
university rules, which may make die freedom of students to manifest their religion subject to 
restrictions as to place and manner intended to ensure harmonious coexistence between students of 
different beliefs.”).  
 197.  See Konttinen v. Finland, App. No. 24949/94, ECHR (1996), The Law ¶ 2, available at 
http://strasbourgconsortium.org/document.php?DocumentID=4753 (“Having joined The Seventh-day 
Adventist Church in 1991, he was free to relinquish his work if he considered that his professional 
duties were not reconcilable with his religious convictions. He could also have taken those Fridays off 
when the beginning of the Sabbath obliged him to leave work before his evening shift had ended.”).  
 198.  See Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek, App. No. 27417/95, at The Law ¶ 80-81 (“[T]here would be 
interference with the freedom to manifest one's religion only if the illegality of performing ritual 
slaughter made it impossible for ultra-orthodox Jews to eat meat from animals slaughtered in 
accordance with the religious prescriptions they considered applicable. But that is not the case. It is not 
contested that the applicant association can easily obtain supplies of “glatt” meat in Belgium.”).  
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always have the ability to change their job, change their living location, 
import necessary items from another location and modify their choices in 
life, these precedents make it very difficult to even conceive of a case in 
which a plaintiff could bring an Article 9 claim and the state would not 
have an appropriate reason as to why the plaintiff’s free exercise right 
should fall before the country’s stipulations. Therefore, plaintiffs bringing 
cases for free exercise in the U.K. must be prepared to rely on the 
traditional British jurisprudence, which protects free expression if there is a 
strong tie between the religious practice and an ethnic group, and the 
religious practice is deemed a necessity for the ethnic group.199 
CONCLUSION 
As the “child” from its parent The United Kingdom, America was, in 
some sense, an attempt to correct deficiencies which its founders saw in 
their parent country. The American desire to allow for free exercise of 
religion, instead of having a single national church, provided a framework 
wherein both the legislature and the Supreme Court articulated an 
understanding of religion as a personal matter and an individual right. 
Based upon this understanding of religion, disputes concerning free 
exercise claims are resolvable without having to examine the nature of the 
religious belief or practice at issue. Once a sincere profession of religious 
belief has been made, the only question before the court is whether the 
government has a right to regulate the disputed action. 
In contrast, the British understanding of religion is that it serves as one 
component of a larger cultural and ethnic framework. Therefore under 
British case law, for cases where a plaintiff would receive protection for his 
or her ethnicity or race, protection will also be provided for acts of free 
exercise of religion. However, the person performing the action must be a 
member of a protected ethnic group, and the action must be deemed a 
necessary practice for the group’s members. Should a plaintiff attempt to 
bring a case under the ECHR, he or she will eventually find themselves 
back within the British framework, as the European Court of Human Rights 
consistently refuses to establish its own position on free exercise claims, 
but instead defers to the national law under which the dispute arose. 
In practice, the British system provides substantive support for smaller 
religions that maintain fairly consistent practices and are practiced by a 
subset of people who could fit the definition of an ethnic group. However, 
 
 199.  See, e.g., Eweida, I.C.R. 890 (case brought under Art. 9 claim and fails); Begum, 1 A.C. 100 
(case brought under Art. 9 claim and fails); JFS, 2 A.C. 728 (case brought under Race Relations Act 
and succeeds).  
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because the standards for establishing that the disputed action is a 
necessary practice are so high, plaintiffs who are members of larger and 
more diverse religious communities risk either receiving an adverse 
judgment or receiving a judgment which strains the British court’s 
jurisprudence in order to support the plaintiff. In contrast, the American 
view benefits a broader array of plaintiffs, because it narrows the scope of 
the court’s inquiry to focus on the action at issue and not the belief behind 
it.  While both nations uphold free exercise of religion as protected right, 
the difference in the way each country characterizes religion has led to the 
creation of different types of protection. 
 
